Communicative action

Habermas details his theory of communication in his essay 'What is universal pragmatics?’ His theory rests on the idea that through self-reflection and analysis of what we say during discussion we can develop a more objective theory of communication. His main concern is that human communication is prone to distortions and that these distortions arise from systems of domination. Any communication process will be shaped by the dominant ideologies within the particular socio-political system. Added to this source of distortion is the personal level of distortion: involuntarily we all make assumptions when speaking and listening. What we take from the message being transmitted will be shaped by our previous experiences, by our own assumptions about the person communicating and by own beliefs about the person and the topic.

If communication seems to be so shaped by the context and by our beliefs it raises a significant question about objectivity. How do we understand what someone says to us? How do we judge its validity? If we misunderstand social discourses then conflicts of meaning can arise. Through communicative action we can aim at mutual understanding.

Communicative action then becomes concerned with conflict resolution within our social world. Habermas' basic premise is that we are all actors within our own social worlds, yet we share social skills and knowledge with others who also belong to that social world. Our social world is therefore governed by norms of behaviour, speech, and knowledge. In theory, because we share such norms, we should be able to communicate - but those very norms can themselves lead to distortions because, as individuals, they lead us towards certain assumptions about what things count as acceptable and valid.

Habermas proposes a system of universal pragmatics that will help us to better understand communication. He believes that participation in dialogue allows for re-interpreting and re-perceiving situations. But in order to move towards re-interpretation we have to move away from distorted communication:

“communicative action stands in correspondence to the suppression of man's own nature. The institutional framework determines the extent of repression by the unreflected, 'natural' force of social dependence and political power, which is rooted in prior history and tradition Emancipation for the compulsion of internal nature succeeds to the degree that institutions based on force are replaced by an organisation of social relations that is bound only to communication free from domination.”

(Habermas: 1986).

Habermas contends that we are all influenced by the social, cultural and historical traditions of our society: these influences are inescapable, however, they can be recognised and analysed. By so doing we can step outside these influences to reach a more objective understanding of modes of communication. Habermas argues that there are three aspects of our social world:

• Objective (facts independent of our thoughts);
• social (interpersonal relations);
• private (subjective world, private experience).

We can explore moral and ethical dilemmas by recognising three aspects that shape our views and understanding. The aim is to recognise these influences, and distance yourself from them so that you can view a communicative situation more objectively.

Yet Habermas is not concerned with all or any communicative situations. He is specifically concerned with forms of argumentation where a pair or group discuss whether a certain practice is acceptable or not. He is not concerned as much with discussions centred on abstract concepts. It is here that Habermas' theories begin to be useful for teachers: we can discuss aspects of our practice, particularly those that concern ethical or moral dimensions, using his concepts of communicative action and emancipatory knowledge. The first stage is, then, to recognise the three aspects of our social world and to be aware of their influences upon us.

In essence Habermas' theory has the potential to prompt us to look at how we construct our own realities, particularly within our professional identity. Construction of identity, and construction of our own notions of professional truth, are perhaps central to how we view our own professionalism as well as our professional interactions. And yet these constructions will inevitably be based on many assumptions and values that we may not always question.